Peer-Reviewed Articles

"A Model of Policy Timing: Hedging, Pandering, and Gambling." American Journal of Political Science, 2026.

"Representation in Collective Policymaking," with Gleason Judd. Games and Economic Behavior, 2026.

"Split Manufacturing Sourcing Strategy Under Risk of Intellectual Property Theft By Overproduction," with Zachary Collier. Journal of Global Operations and Strategic Sourcing, 2025.

"The Reputation Politics of the Filibuster." Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2023.

"Individual Accountability, Collective Decision-making." Constitutional Political Economy, 2023.

"Civil Service Reform, Self-Selection, and Bureaucratic Performance." Economics & Politics, 2020.

"Selection Rates and Bureaucratic Performance." Economics of Governance, 2019.

Book Chapters

"F.A. Hayek and the Administrative State." Exploring the Political Economy and Social Philosophy of F.A. Hayek, eds. Boettke, Peter J., Storr, Virgil Henry, and Jayme Lemke, 2018.

Papers Under Review

"Endogenous Policy Timing and Electoral Accountability."

"Dynamic Policy Development and Implementation," with Benjamin Shaver

Media

"Senators use obstructions like the filibuster to signal policy priorities to key constituencies." LSE United States Politics and Policy Blog. April 19, 2024.

Selected Working Papers and Works in Progress

"Virtue Signaling: A Theory of Message Legislation," with Charles Cameron.

"Message Legislation and the Politics of Virtue Signaling," with Jesse Crosson and Charles Cameron.

"Legislator Prerogative: A Distributional Model," with Justin Fox.

Forthcoming Editor-Reviewed Articles

"Civil Service Reform."

"Elections and the Limits of Accountability in American Democracy."